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INTRODUCTION 
For a half century, campaign finance jurisprudence has turned on 
the Supreme Court’s distinction between political contributions and 
campaign expenditures. In Buckley v. Valeo,1 the Court upheld the 
Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on political contributions to 
candidates for federal office and struck down various provisions that 
had limited campaign expenditures made by candidates, campaigns, 
and individuals.2 In upholding the contribution limits, the Court 
concluded that contributions implicate rights of speech and 
association, but only up to a point.3 It was “speech by proxy” through 
which the donor surrendered control of the use of the funds, and 
therefore the precise message funded, to the recipient. By contrast, 
the expenditure is purer expression, because the funder and the 
spender are the same and the money spent travels from the wallet of 
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 1.  424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 2.  Id. at 143. 
 3.  See id. at 20–21 (finding that “a limitation upon the amount that any one person or 
group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction 
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” because the contribution 
serves as a general expression of support but “does not communicate the underlying basis for 
the support”); id. at 22 (noting that the Act’s $1000 limitation on independent expenditures did 
not prevent “like-minded persons [from] pool[ing] their resources in furtherance of common 
political goals,” but it did preclude “most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of 
their adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the 
freedom of association”). 
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the spender directly to the airwaves or into the mailbox. Under 
Buckley, Congress has more leeway to limit campaign contributions 
and less leeway to regulate expenditures—particularly where the 
expenditures are independent of candidate control or influence. 
This framework has withstood the critiques directed against it for 
many years.4 Four of the current Justices of the Supreme Court have 
declared their readiness to reconsider the distinction between 
contributions and expenditures,5 yet the criticisms of Buckley 
continue to be conducted within the very terms it set. The arguments 
remain primarily about adjustments in the balance to be struck 
between government regulatory interests and First Amendment 
speech protections.6  Proponents of de-regulated politics propose to 
protect more speech by granting greater First Amendment 
protections to contributions. Supporters of more active regulation of 
campaign spending come at the problem the other way, disputing the 
privileged speech value of the independent expenditure. More speech 
or less speech: this is how the choice is portrayed.7 
 
 
 4.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s refusal to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits rests upon 
Buckley’s discounting of the First Amendment interests at stake. The analytic foundation of 
Buckley, however, was tenuous from the very beginning . . . .” 
 5.  See, e.g., id. at 407 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the current framework “would be 
unfortunate . . . if evolved from a deliberate legislative choice; but its unhappy origins are in 
[the] earlier decree in Buckley, which by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting 
contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting expenditures) created a misshapen system, one 
which distorts the meaning of speech”); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 
U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (starting, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Scalia: “I would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo . . . . 
Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally significant difference between 
campaign contributions and expenditures: both forms of speech are central to the First 
Amendment’’).  
 6.  See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that if Buckley was 
interpreted as “den[ying] the political branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive 
solutions to the problems posed by campaign finance,” then “the Constitution would require 
[the Court] to reconsider Buckley”); id. at 410–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
Buckley discounts First Amendment interests).  
 7.  The literature on the contribution/expenditure distinction is voluminous. For a 
sampling of views on various sides of the issue, see generally Jocelyn Benson, Saving 
Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-Citizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
723, 741–42 (2012); Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, “Sham Issue Advocacy,” and 
Buckley v. Valeo: A Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285 (2000); James Bopp, 
Jr. & Susan Lee, So There are Campaign Contribution Limits that are Too Low, 18 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 266 (2007); Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the 
Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 235 (2010). 
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There is more, however, to the deficiencies of Buckley. It did not 
capture the range of First Amendment interests at stake; “speech” 
does not exhaust that range. Neither does its cousin—expressive 
association. The missing dimension of the First Amendment analysis is 
the interest in political action: the business of building coalitions and 
acting in concert with allies and others to achieve common political 
goals. This interest—one could call it “doing politics”—is irreducible 
to speech interests alone. 
The constitutional lens through which the Buckley debate has 
been conducted leaves insufficient space for this critical interest in 
“doing politics.” Restoring the interest in “doing politics” to the 
discussion would contribute to understanding the unsatisfactory, 
inconsistent, and confused applications of the current doctrine,8 and 
would bring to light the costs exacted by the current doctrine’s 
singular focus on speech interests as a concern separated from the 
larger sphere of political action. 
In bringing out more clearly this interest in “doing politics,” it is 
instructive to review a major legislative and regulatory struggle of 
recent years: distinguishing the truly independent expenditure from 
the “sham” one that the candidate has somehow coordinated with the 
spender.9 The question here has been how far the candidate or her 
agents can go in collaborating with allies before effective politics 
become the regulatory problem of illegal “coordination.” Over a 
number of years, and increasing in urgency upon the enactment of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold), Congress, the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), and the courts attempted to 
shape workable coordination rules. Political actors generally 
supportive of regulatory reform, such as organized labor, questioned 
the effect of these rules on coalition building and associational 
activity.10 A large part of the problem seems to stem from the absence 
 
 8.  Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010) (“[I]ndependent 
expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”), with 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (holding that due process required 
a state trial court judge to recuse himself from participation in a case where one party had made 
significant independent expenditures in support of the judge’s campaign).  
 9.  See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (assessing the constitutionality of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform’s Acts expenditure limits as applied to a non-profit corporation 
that released a documentary critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton); McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003) (determining the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 
which, among other things, attempted to distinguish between independent expenditures and 
coordinated contributions, and afforded different regulations for each). 
 10.  See generally AFL-CIO, Comments on Proposed Rulemaking (Jan. 13, 2006), available 
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of clarity about the interests at the heart of the dispute—the interest 
in “doing politics.” 
I. THE CONTRIBUTION/EXPENDITURE DISTINCTION AND 
THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATED EXPENDITURES 
The privileged place of the expenditure rests on the premise that 
it is the spender’s speech.11 The spender’s speech is “independent” 
speech—speech entirely the speaker’s own in content and in 
distribution that is not directed by, made at the request or suggestion 
of, or in concert or consultation with the candidate. Once the speech is 
funded at the direction of or in close consultation with the candidate, 
its character changes entirely and it becomes functionally 
indistinguishable from the contribution provided to the candidate for 
use as she pleases.12 
This latter type of contribution—in form an expenditure, but in 
function just like a contribution—is known as a “coordinated 
expenditure.”13 Much of the legislative and regulatory mission of 
recent years has been directed toward distinguishing the coordinated 
expenditure from the truly independent one and thus toward 
determining which expenditures share the constitutionally less 
protected status of contributions.14 To supporters of stricter limits on 
campaign spending, the regulation of coordinated expenditures has 
been lax, and the failure of regulators to police them has opened up a 
massive loophole in the law through which expenditures flow on sham 
claims of independence.15 One way or the other, organizations with 
 
at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coord_commun/comm25.pdf; AFL-CIO, Comments on 
Proposed Rulemaking (Oct. 11, 2002), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coor_and_ind_ 
expenditures/afl-cio.pdf. 
 11.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1976) (explaining that “expenditures for 
express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of the candidate and his campaign” 
fall firmly under the protection of the First Amendment right to “‘speak one’s mind . . . on all 
public institutions’” and are less dangerous because the potential for abuse is diminished by 
their independent nature (citation omitted)). 
 12.  See id. at 46 (“[E]xpenditures controlled by or coordinated with the candidate and his 
campaign . . . are treated as contributions rather than expenditures . . . .”). 
 13.  See id. at 47 (describing the Act’s contribution ceiling as a measure to “prevent 
attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to 
disguised contributions”). 
 14.  See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.); Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 33190-02 (June 8, 2006) (“The Commission’s rules set out a three-prong test for 
determining whether a communication is ‘coordinated’ with, and therefore an in-kind 
contribution to, a Federal candidate or a political party committee.”).  
 15.  E.g., Daniel W. Butrymowicz, Note, Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully 
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plenty of money find ways to collude (i.e., coordinate) with candidates 
or parties. But they deny it, of course.16 
Proponents of de-regulated politics reply that the government 
inquiry into coordination, particularly its more subtle forms, would 
simply erase the difference between contribution and expenditure.17 
After all, flat-out collusion is never really the issue. It may happen, 
but if it does, few would deny that the expenditure loses its protected 
character. The clash over the appropriate regulatory treatment of 
coordination focuses much more on the means by which candidates or 
parties steer expenditures by others that are nominally 
“independent.” Maybe the independent expenditure is mapped out by 
individuals who previously worked for the candidate or party, or by 
the same media firm that works for the candidate. Or the candidate 
and the party have had contact over the normal course of a political 
relationship, creating an opportunity for strategically useful 
information to pass from the candidate to the spender. If these are 
cases of illegal “coordination,” skeptics of regulation argue, then 
Congress will have a vast, unjustifiable authority to regulate 
expenditures.18 
The controversy continues with little sign of abating. And here we 
see a problem with a speech-centered analysis. In effect the choice 
presented by the Buckley framework is between pure speech, fully 
protected, and a less pure version—less pure because the speech has 
been put to the service of political action and is intertwined with the 
candidate. Speak at a distance, and you are safe; speak to or with allies 
at close quarters, and regulatory pressures intensify. 
 
 
Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1708–10 
(2009). 
 16.  See, e.g., Rachel Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super 
PACs, Candidates Tough to Enforce, THE CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:00 
AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/13/7866/rules-against-coordination-between-super-
pacs-candidates-tough-enforce (describing the FEC’s investigation of Congressman Joe Schwarz 
for improper coordination with Republican Main Street Partnership PAC).  
 17.  E.g., Brad Smith, Clearing Up Confusion About American Crossroads and the Content 
Standard Coordinated Expenditures, CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POL. (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.campaignfreedom.org/2011/12/21/clearing-up-confusion-about-american-crossroads-
and-the-content-standard-coordinated-expenditures/. 
 18.  See, e.g., Center for Competitive Politics, Comments on Proposed Rulemaking at 5 
(Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coord_commun/comm02.pdf; Nat’l 
Republican Campaign Comm., Comments on Proposed Rulemaking at 2 (Oct. 11, 2002), 
available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/coor_and_ind_expenditures/nrcc.pdf.  
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In recent years, following the enactment of McCain-Feingold in 
2002, the escalated rulemaking and enforcement of “coordination” 
rules has illustrated the difficulties resulting from slighting the 
interest in political action. 
II. THE FIGHT OVER “COORDINATION” 
McCain-Feingold directed the repeal of the existing coordinated 
expenditure rules and ordered a fresh FEC rulemaking process to 
replace it.19  Congress specifically instructed the FEC to address cases 
where spenders republished the candidate’s own materials or used 
common vendors or former candidates and party employees to skirt 
the requirement of true independence.20 Moreover, Congress barred 
the new regulations from “requir[ing] agreement or formal 
collaboration” between the candidate and spender in order “to 
establish coordination.”21 As a result, it would be enough that 
strategically useful information passed—by whatever manner of 
suggestion, by “wink or nod”—from the candidate to the spender.22 
In the litigation over McCain-Feingold, the coordinated 
expenditure provision came under attack along with others, but the 
usual opponents of regulated campaign finance found an ally on this 
issue in organized labor. The American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a long-time 
proponent of campaign finance reform, raised concerns that the 
direction given to the agency was too vague and could result in 
constitutionally intolerable interference with normal—and 
indispensable—political communications and association. In its brief 
to the Court in McConnell v. FEC,23 the AFL-CIO raised the issue 
through a series of questions: 
Does a political party “request or suggest” expenditures by third 
parties when a party official publicly identifies the party’s principal 
campaign themes and the states where the party hopes to prevail? 
 
 19.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 214(b). See also 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.1–109.37 
(2013); 11 C.F.R. § 100.23 (2002) (repealed). 
 20.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 214(c). 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221–22 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a ‘wink 
or nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’ For that reason, Congress has 
always treated expenditures made ‘at the request or suggestion of’ a candidate as coordinated.” 
(quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 442 (2001))).  
 23.  540 U.S. 93 (2003). The Court consolidated a number of cases in McConnell, and the 
AFL-CIO was appearing as an appellant from AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
and as an appellee from McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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Is the result different if the same message is delivered in a 
“private” strategy session, and, if so, how many party activists must 
be present before a meeting loses its private character? Has a 
union official acted “in cooperation . . . or concert with” a political 
party if he meets with the party’s congressional leadership to plan 
strategy in support of the party’s legislative agenda, including 
union expenditures in support of that agenda? If a trade 
association lobbyist participates in planning party activities during 
the early stages of a campaign season, will the use of information 
she has learned about the party’s plans turn all of her group’s 
subsequent independent expenditures into contributions because 
of improper “consultation”?24 
The AFL-CIO also argued that without a requirement of “agreement 
or formal collaboration,” the rule Congress contemplated could not 
pass constitutional muster: “[W]ithout proof of ‘agreement or formal 
collaboration,’ the statutory provisions clearly reach a broad range of 
conduct, including mere consultation with a candidate or party, which 
is constitutionally protected.”25 
The AFL-CIO’s questions, coupled with the attention paid to 
ongoing “consultation” with allies, suggest the nature of the interest 
most threatened by free-ranging anti-coordination rules. It is a speech 
interest, yes, in part, but also a strong associational interest: the 
interest in effective coalitions and alliances with those, including 
candidates and parties, who broadly share the AFL-CIO’s goals. 
Moreover, investigative inquiry into “coordination” is not without 
consequence: it further burdens the associational right, compounding 
the doctrinal infirmities the AFL-CIO identified. The AFL-CIO 
argued that regulatory enforcement can be “crippling” and 
“intrusive,” involving “extensive discovery into the inner workings of 
[an] organization” and requiring the release of “extraordinarily 
sensitive political information [including] plans and strategies for 
winning elections, materials detailing political and associational 
activities, and personal information concerning hundreds of 
employees, volunteers and members.”26 
The AFL-CIO lost its point with the Court. The five Justices 
voting to uphold the better part of the reform were not troubled by 
 
 24.  Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 36–37, McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (No. 
02-1755).  
 25.  Id. at 43. 
 26.  Id. at 35 n.22 (quoting AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2001)). 
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the congressional initiative on coordination.27 Specifically, the Court 
dismissed the AFL-CIO’s fear that without limiting any eventual rule 
to agreements or formal collaboration, the FEC was sure to go too 
far.28 The Court concluded that Congress has latitude to determine 
that any independence a spender claims is “total.”29 Any limitation to 
agreements or formal collaboration would tie the regulators’ hands 
and defeat their inquiry into subterranean or surreptitious 
maneuvers—the sort of inquiries the AFL-CIO described as 
“crippling” and “intrusive.”30 
This was not the last word on the subject. The FEC promulgated 
rules, reform organizations twice sued and won, and the rules were 
twice revised.31 In the course of litigation, it became clear that the 
courts were limited by Buckley’s conceptual apparatus in defining the 
full range of interests implicated in these contested rules. 
The FEC responded to the congressional directive in McCain-
Feingold by relaxing the regulation of communications disseminated 
more than four months prior to an election.32 In those cases, the 
communication would not be considered “coordinated”—that is, 
treated as a contribution subject to investigation and limits—unless 
the spender expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate.33 Mere reference to a candidate, coupled with 
criticism of her position, would not be enough.34 The district court in 
Shays v. Federal Election Commission35 rejected this approach, on the 
ground that “coordinated communications expenditures [are] 
contributions regardless of their content or when they are 
broadcast.”36 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court 
declined to go that far: The FEC could appropriately create “space for 
collaboration between politicians and outsiders on legislative and 
political issues involving only a weak nexus to any electoral 
 
 27.  See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 221–22 (“[W]e cannot agree with the submission that [the] 
new [standard] is overbroad because it permits a finding of coordination or cooperation 
notwithstanding the absence of a pre-existing agreement.”). 
 28.  Id. at 221–23. 
 29.  Id. at 223. 
 30.  Id. at 221–23. 
 31.  A reform organization sued the FEC in 2002, see Shays v. FEC (Shays I), 414 F.3d 76 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), and again in 2006, see Shays v. FEC (Shays II), 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 32.  See Coordinated and Independent Expenditures, 68 Fed. Reg. 421-01 (Jan. 3, 2003). 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 36.  Id. at 64. 
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campaign.”37 Thus, though the FEC had failed to give a “cogent 
explanation” for the line it drew, there was such a line—one that 
“separates election-related advocacy from other activity falling 
outside [Federal Election Campaign Act’s] expenditure definition.”38 
The circuit court weighed the interest in ordinary course politics 
against the government’s interest in regulating campaign finance, but 
it did not precisely identify the former. This political interest follows 
in part from Buckley—a right to speak on issues that are not deemed 
sufficiently “election-related” to warrant the imposition of regulatory 
limits.39 But there is also an interest, which Buckley only weakly 
expresses,40 in a “space” for political activity—“collaboration between 
politicians and outsiders on legislative and political issues”—that, 
even with some election-related impact, should be able to proceed 
without threat of regulatory limit or intervention.41 The circuit court in 
Shays could not give this “space” its full articulation, hampered by the 
speech focus of Buckley; the court’s analysis was confined to the 
accepted boundaries of the Buckley argument, turning on whether the 
speech in question was more “express” advocacy than “issues” 
advocacy. In the end, the issue before the court in Shays was speech 
and only speech, and in particular the nature of the speech, which in 
turn determined the level of protection to which the speech was 
entitled. 
Eventually, the successive rounds of litigation concluded and the 
coordination rules were settled. Yet, the arguments over the rules’ 
sufficiency have not ended. As the campaign laws have frayed, worn 
somewhat thinner by Supreme Court adjudication,42 and as forms of 
political action have changed with the advent of PACs and a freshly 
assertive community of tax-exempt organizations like Crossroads 
GPS,43 these arguments have acquired fresh intensity. Critics believe 
that the rules are weak, bordering on useless, and that what is needed 
 
 37.  Shays I, 414 F.3d 76, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 38.  Id. at 100, 102. 
 39.  Id. at 80. 
 40.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“The First Amendment protects political 
association as well as political expression.”).  
 41.  Shays I, 414 F.3d at 99. 
 42.  See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 43.  Matea Gold, Secret Donors Pour Millions of Dollars into Crossroads GPS, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/17/news/la-pn-secret-donors-pour-millions-
of-dollars-into-crossroads-gps-20120417. 
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is a set of restrictions on all the channels of communication between 
super PACs, tax-exempts, and the candidates and parties that may 
facilitate “collusion.”44 Their goal is “total independence.”45 
But the nature of the interest identified by the AFL-CIO in the 
McConnell litigation bears closer examination. At issue was the 
associational interest inherent in political organizing and concerted 
action—an interest in action and not merely in expression. And the 
standard debate on campaign finance, so preoccupied with the values 
of “speech,” takes limited account of the associational interest and 
may even be hostile to it.46 What constitutes organizing and concerted 
action in the eyes of one observer may strike another as merely the 
elements of a conspiracy. 
III. “COORDINATION,” ASSOCIATION, AND CONCERTED 
POLITICAL ACTION 
Returning to the basic contribution and expenditure distinction, it 
becomes possible to see the secondary position of the associational 
interest in the Buckley framework, i.e., the interest that seems closest 
in substance and spirit to the interest in concerted political action. A 
contribution to a political organization is an act of pooling and 
managing resources with others; it presents just the feature of 
association—the drive to concerted action. The Court in Buckley was 
more concerned with contributions as acts of speech, and as a diluted 
form of such expression or speech by “proxy,” which could be subject 
to greater regulatory control.47 For the Court, the associational 
element was important only insofar as it was a form of expression, the 
vehicle by which support is symbolically communicated: 
 
 44.  See, e.g., Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, Campaign Finance: Remedies Beyond the 
Court, 27 DEMOCRACY J. 38, 40 (Winter 2013) (“[T]he FEC regulations that govern whether a 
group is considered to ‘coordinate’ its expenditures with a candidate or political party are so 
permissive that they have proven more apt as a source of comedic inspiration than anything 
else.”). 
 45.  See, e.g., id. (claiming that new FEC regulations or a statutory definition of 
coordination could achieve “whole, total, true” independence).  
 46.  As Steven Bilakovics describes this spirit of anti-politics, “‘Politics’ has probably 
always been something of a dirty word. In America today it seems exclusively and irretrievably 
so.” STEVEN BILAKOVICS, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT POLITICS 1 (2012). He describes “general 
contempt of contemporary politics” and rejection of “the available practices of politics . . . as a 
means to make things better.” Id.  
 47.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (“While contributions may result in political 
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the 
transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
contributor.”).   
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The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge 
on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like 
joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a 
candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool their 
resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act’s 
contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating 
with a candidate or committee, but leave the contributor free to 
become a member of any political association and to assist 
personally in the association’s efforts on behalf of candidates. And 
the Act’s contribution limitations permit associations and 
candidates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective 
advocacy.48 
According to the Court, this is a less serious problem from a 
constitutional point of view than limits on “independent 
expenditures”: 
By contrast, the Act’s $1,000 limitation on independent 
expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate” precludes 
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their 
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First 
Amendment protection of the freedom of association. The Act’s 
constraints on the ability of independent associations and 
candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on political 
expression “is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of 
(their) adherents.”49 
The Court acknowledged the core associational value—that the 
contribution “enables like-minded persons to pool their resources in 
furtherance of common political goals”—but it decided that even if 
the contributions hamper this collective political endeavor, “the 
contributor [is still] free to become a member of any political 
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts on 
behalf of candidates.”50 In other words, in place of money, the 
contributor can enjoy membership (does the Court mean here yet 






 48.  Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 49.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 50.  Id. 
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But as Theda Skocpol has astutely observed, “money is important 
for association building” and without it, or without enough of it, we 
have diminished associational participation in civic and political life—
a problem exacerbated by reforms structured with a bias toward 
“elevating the thinking individual over all kinds of group 
mobilization.”51 And from a progressive perspective, Skocpol worries 
that “intentionally or not, late-twentieth century . . . reforms have 
pushed our polity away from true popular mobilization in politics,” 
which has “further[ed] the tilt toward the rich and those with 
advanced degrees.”52 
To the extent that coordination rules convert expenditures into 
contributions, moving the money spent into less protected 
communications, they do so on the premise that organizations 
engaged in coordination are simply enhancing their election-related 
speech.53 But, as the AFL-CIO pointed out, an organization may make 
a wide variety of contacts in the course of building, maintaining, or 
expanding its program of concerted political action.54 This is political 
activity that we might define as an associational whole greater than its 
constituent speech parts. Not all these contacts have as their goal or 
end-point an advertising campaign, and not all public communications 
that emerge after these contacts are directed toward elections rather 
than, say, communication with officials and the public about public 
policy matters.55 
One can imagine a hypothetical enforcement official wincing at 
this statement and complaining, not unreasonably, that political 
communications may be undertaken for a variety of purposes, and 
that if the multiplicity of function or motive is enough to scuttle 
inquiry or enforcement, then the rules will be largely worthless. 
Communication between a donor and a party may serve other shared 
 
 51.  THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT 
IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 206, 282 (2004).  
 52.  Id. at 282–83 (2004). 
 53.  See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (“[I]ndependent expenditures . . . provide little assistance 
to the candidate’s campaign . . . . The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an 
expenditure . . . not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate.”). See also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 222–23 (2003) 
(“Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that [the Federal Election Campaign Act’s definition of 
coordination] has chilled political speech.”). 
 54.  Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 24, at 7–8. 
 55.  See, e.g., Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union to Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse and 
Lindsey Graham at 3 (Apr. 9, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/4-9-13_--
_campaign_finance_hearing_final.pdf. 
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goals, like the passage of legislation, but it may also, as a matter of 
fact, aid in coordinating election-related messages. The presence of 
other benefits achieved from the communication does not excuse the 
speaker for ignoring the electoral gain. To adopt willful blindness on 
this point would only encourage political actors to construct 
communications they can defend as primarily or at least partly 
dedicated to other, non-campaign objectives. 
This issue, not alone among campaign finance regulatory issues, 
requires the balancing of risk and reward. The reward is a flexible 
standard for judging coordination, allowing for tougher enforcement 
and engendering a healthier wariness within the regulated community 
about testing the boundaries of the law. The risk is raising the cost of 
association understood as political action and making it that much 
harder for alliances to be assembled and effectively managed. The law 
as now constructed, and the proposals for strengthening it, are highly 
attuned to the reward, but—so critics might say—less informed about 
or sensitive to the risks.56 A campaign finance jurisprudence that 
assigns so little weight to the associational interest in political action, 
effectively defining it as a form and, for that matter, a lower-rung 
form of the expressive interest, does not satisfactorily frame for 
decision this question of balancing risk and reward. 
By design, the enforcement of the coordination rules is necessarily, 
on contemporary enforcement theory, invasive. Coordination rules 
are meant to ferret out the sharing of information—the rules speak of 
information transmitted about a candidate or party’s “plans, projects, 
activities or needs”—and to determine whether this information was 
material somehow to the fashioning of election-related speech.57 
Moreover, under these rules, investigators also consider the identities 
of individuals involved in communications and whether they had 
prior staff or professional relationships with the candidate or party.58 
As the AFL-CIO pointed out, active investigative inquiry into these 
matters is in and of itself “intrusive.”59 Such is the case whenever the 
questions asked about political communications are who said what, 
when, and to whom. 
 
 
 56.  See, e.g., id. at 3–4 (urging Congress to be wary of crafting rules that “chill[] legitimate 
issue advocacy”). 
 57.  See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2013) (defining a “coordinated communication”). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Brief of AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 24, at 34. 
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The question about the current campaign finance doctrine’s 
treatment of associational interests does not arise only in relation to 
the operation of so-called outside groups, the super PACs and tax-
exempt advocacy groups. In recent years, the Supreme Court has held 
that parties can spend freely on elections only if they do so 
independently of their candidates.60 And McCain-Feingold, of course, 
through its prohibition on party soft money, limited the resources 
parties had available to spend without limit when adopting this 
posture of “independence.”61 Strange as it may seem, parties are also 
subject to coordination rules—that is, with their own candidates.62 
Perhaps there is no better illustration of the weak standing of the 
associational interest—the interest in “doing politics”—as defined for 
our purposes here. 
IV. THINKING ABOUT THE INTEREST IN “DOING POLITICS” 
The constitutional jurisprudence of the day takes political action 
and effectively compresses it into individual speech units.63 Political 
activity is valuable insofar as it accommodates acceptably each of 
these speech units; it is made up of them and serves to organize and 
transmit them.64 Hence the associational interest we recognize is an 
expressive one. We associate to communicate views, and the 
association per se is, as an interest, purely instrumental in character. 
But, as Professor George Kateb has written, “to instrumentalize a 
right is to invite abridgements of it.”65 
The question presented by these considerations is now to 
reconceive First Amendment rights to encompass more than speech 
rights, or association in its role as an expressive activity. Any 
reimagining requires breaking free of the ingrained prejudice against 
political action—politics as activity rather than as just a forum for the 
expression of competing points of view.66 It is not surprising that in the 
 
 60.  Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 (1996). 
 61.  Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 323(a)(1), 116 Stat. 
81 (codified as amended in 2 U.S.C  § 441i). 
 62.  2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(d)(3)(B)(4) (West 2013). 
 63.  See, e.g., Shays I, 414 F.3d 76, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (framing the issue before the Court 
as one concerning speech, and in particular the nature of the speech and the level of protection 
to which it is entitled). 
 64.  See, e.g., Robert F. Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right of 
Association, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199, 199 (2004). 
 65.  George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 35, 53 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1998). 
 66.  FRANK J. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 147 (1964) (“In 
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courts, or the academy, those who make their living through oral and 
written expression have a particular view of politics—that is, of good 
politics—rooted in their professional experience. Within this 
community, naked appeals to self-interest, deal-making, and the 
bewitchments of expensive, slickly produced media campaigns are 
somewhat distasteful. People are not reasoning together; they are not 
moving one another to consensus following an informed “debate on 
the issues.” Politics is understood to call on baser instincts or on 
strategies best pursued in the shadows, even if to some degree 
necessarily so.67 But there are higher and lower forms of politics, and 
persuasive speech occupies the high rung while political action in its 
various gritty forms is found well below it. 
Beyond this resistance to political action as almost morally 
suspect and certainly inferior to the operation of the free speech 
market, the character of political action is oversimplified to its 
detriment. It includes speech, but more than speech: Action and 
speech are inextricable in the realm of politics. One cannot be 
divorced from the other in this realm, one in which individuals 
interacting as equals strive in concert to fashion what is new.68 People 
talk and argue with each other, build and re-build coalitions, both 
temporary and more enduring ones; they speak while they organize, 
and organize through speech, and this political space is alive with 
noise and energy. Often, case law assumes that politics exists to serve 
speech,69 whereas, in the sense intended here, speech serves politics, 
and action and speech are the constituent and interdependent parts of 
political life. Hannah Arendt reminds us that the “promise of politics” 
resides in part in rescuing for action its proper place: In the Greek 
conception of the polis, “speech itself was from the start considered a 
form of action.”70  
 
the most general way one can, however, point to the widespread American suspicion of and 
distaste for politics and politicians as the basic element of the American political culture.”). 
 67.  See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, Politics and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 55 
(1981) (“It is widely believed that the practice of politics selects at least for cynicism and 
perhaps for brutality in its practitioners.”). 
 68.  See HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 125–26 (2007). 
 69.  See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 64, at 199 (noting that the Court in Buckley assessed 
“[r]estrictions on expenditures—on direct speech”—under strict scrutiny, whereas 
“[c]ontribution restrictions, more immediately significant in the Court’s view to the exercise of 
associational rights” were treated differently); id. at 201 (discussing the McConnell Court’s 
refusal to “reevaluate the associational issues,” which the parties raised more directly in 
McConnell than in Buckley). 
 70.  ARENDT, supra note 68, at 125. 
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Of what does this action consist? It is in essence an effort to 
“initiate a sequence, to forge a new chain,” and the political leader is 
the one who, in the launch of initiative—in taking action—“[seeks] 
out companions to help him carry it out.”71 Central to this concept is 
the assembly of men and women, which is a coming together, to 
pursue collective purposes. Unlike the unitary focus on speech—on 
self-expression—action must be pursued through the citizens in active 
engagement with one another, for, once again in Arendt’s words, “it is 
only action that cannot even be imagined outside the society of 
men.”72 It is a realm of freedom, properly valued (rather than 
questioned skeptically) on its own terms. It is the antithesis of mere 
rule, through which an elite issues orders to followers expected to 
obey them. As Arendt explained: “[T]he commonplace notion . . . that 
every political community consists of those who rule and those who 
are ruled . . . rests on a suspicion of action.”73 
In contemporary terms, political action might be imagined as the 
means by which strategies are formulated and executed.74 Political 
strategy, in turn, depends on speech: speech among those who are 
devising the strategy, and speech as a means of executing the strategy 
in various ways to enlist the support of others. In a speech-centered 
vision of politics, the strategic uses of speech are questioned as tools 
of manipulation and misrepresentation.75 If speech is reasoned 
discourse, disciplined by particular conventions of logic and evidence, 
then politically strategic speech presents in all its rhetorical flourishes, 
its appeals to emotion, and its frequent evasions and hair-splitting, the 
antithesis of what a healthy polity needs. Yet moral qualms about 
strategy, while reflecting in part a healthy suspicion of politics, can 
slide easily into derogation of the political sphere and fail to grasp the 
indispensability of action to concrete political achievement. 
 
 
 71.  Id. at 126. 
 72.  HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22 (2d ed. 1998). 
 73.  Id. at 222. 
 74.  GEORGE BEAM & DICK SIMPSON, POLITICAL ACTION: THE KEY TO 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICS 17 (1984).  
 75.  See BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE AMERICAN LIE 193 (2007) (“[Many candidates for 
high office] habitually stretch the truth as it serves their political purposes. . . . [P]oliticians 
construct a variety of imaginative fibs to present self-serving conduct as actually serving broader 
public purposes, to build or demolish political coalitions or to mobilize and energize their 
supporters.”). See also BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION 2 (2009) (“In trying to 
persuade, democratic politicians may end up manipulating their audiences, or they may end up 
pandering to them.”). 
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The disregard of action in a speech-centered view of the First 
Amendment is not without a political bias consequence. Giving pride 
of place to “reasoned discourse” is advantageous to those with the 
skills to speak persuasively or the means to produce much of the 
speech that they hope is persuasive. In other words, the financial and 
educated elites stand to do well when jurisprudence favors speech at 
the expense of action, and when jurisprudence values persuasion over 
strategic uses of speech as an imperative of effective action. And even 
where the courts have looked out for the little guy, seeking in 
campaign finance to protect the rights of those of lesser means, the 
outcome has been quite different than expected.76 The doctrine of free 
speech designed in part to benefit the “little guy” has become, 
contrary to original judicial intent, a constitutional shield for the “big 
guy.”77 
A shift in First Amendment theory toward the affirmative 
recognition of political action does not require superimposing on the 
constitutional text an alien conception. Recent scholarship has sought 
to recover something like this complex compound of speech and 
action in addressing the early history and then gradual decay of the 
rights to assembly and petition.78 Each of these rights has virtually 
vanished from contemporary jurisprudence—thirty years have passed 
without a Supreme Court decision based on the right of assembly.79 In 
each case, a conception of collective political action has been 
subordinated to the primacy of the right to speech.80 Moreover, 
neither is fairly represented by a right to association, which is defined 
in modern terms by its expressive function and uninformed by any 
notion of the independent value of action. 
Yet the right to petition, before it faded from the case law, offered 
a perfect “hybrid” right combining speech and action—a right that 
blended “speech, mass assembly, and association as part and parcel 
of . . . law reform efforts.”81 The right of assembly, before its 
 
 76.  Robert Bauer, Remarks at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 
Symposium: First the Little Guy, Then the Big Guy (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=47501. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  See generally John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 
(2010) (discussing the importance of the freedom of assembly to social movements in earlier 
American history and its gradual decay over the past few decades).  
 79.  JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 62 
(2012). 
 80.  See supra notes 11–12, 27–30 and accompanying text. 
 81.  RONALD KROTOSZYNSKI, RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE 11, 82 (2012).  
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annexation to speech rights, encompassed “far more than the right to 
hold a meeting.”82 As a “right to gather and exist in groups,”83 the right 
of assembly partook of the same character as petitioning—an activity 
involving the coming together of individuals who shared and pursued 
the same political objectives. Both the rights to assemble and petition 
were integral to movement politics, particularly the abolition and 
women’s movements of the nineteenth century.84 And movement 
politics depend on a sustained, strategically pursued commitment to 
effective political action.85 This constitutional heritage is available for 
reclamation by building into the scope of First Amendment interests a 
right to political action. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing in 1997, when an early version of McCain-Feingold was 
under consideration but the reform was still five years off, John B. 
Judis worried that organized politics was receiving inadequate 
attention. Organizations, he wrote, are “really the only way for 
individuals who are not billionaires to exert power.”86 To counter 
inequality in the economic system, “average citizens . . . had to 
organize in labor unions, civil rights organizations, civic organizations, 
and other associations, and they had to work through the political 
parties.”87 
So, Judis concluded, political reform, far from seeking to eliminate 
or curb organized interests, should be structured to encourage them—
so that “organized interests of workers and citizens can contend 
equally with those of business and the wealthy.”88 What he describes 
as law’s proper aim takes fully into account how political strategies 
are developed in consultation among allies who then proceed to act in 
pursuit of their common goals. Their interest lies very specifically in 
this action—in a right to act, and not just to speak. 
 
 82.  INAZU, supra note 79, at 33. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Inazu notes the multiple and interrelated purposes served by activities organized 
through and in support of movement politics. The “open air” campaigns developed by 
suffragettes attracted national press, facilitated the acquisition of organizing capabilities, and 
established a sense of partnership and solidarity among the participants. Id. at 45. 
 85.  James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the 
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 292–93 (1990). 
 86.  John B. Judis, Goo-Goos Versus Populists, 30 THE AMERICAN PROSPECT 12, 13 
(1997). 
 87.  Id. at 14. 
 88.  Id.  
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To recognize this right to act—to “do politics”—will require the 
re-evaluation of deeply held assumptions about politics, and a 
reworking of the framework that has prized only the most isolated 
form of speech, the speech disconnected from action, and accorded 
the weakest protections to the type of speech that links us together 
and presents itself in the form of concerted political enterprise. To 
value action, we have to value, not distrust, collective political action 
and the strategies through which it is effected. 
 
